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Abstract
The relatively rapid rise in popularity of social networking services is
now well known. MySpace, Twitter, and Facebook have become well
known sites and terms. According to the Web traffic tracking site
Alexa.com, as of December 2009, Facebook had 350 million registered
users, MySpace just under 475 million, and Twitter 44.5 million. Many
people think very little of posting prodigious amounts of personal
information on social networking sites, not realizing that this information
puts them at risk. Specifically, those in the law enforcement and military
communities may not realize that information posted on these sites can
compromise operational security and potentially endanger lives. In July
2009, the Associated Press ran a story which was picked up by most
major news outlets in the USA, in which it was reported that the wife of
the incoming head of Britain's MI6 intelligence agency had posted
pictures and family details on her Facebook page. Astonishingly, there
were those that argued that this was not a security breach! Although it is
true that, in general, photos of a vacationing family would not be
considered sensitive, when you consider that the family taking the
vacation includes the head of the British foreign intelligence service, it is
easy to see how this kind of exposure could open the door to potential
blackmail.We are all too aware of the possibility of terrorist "sleeper
cells" living among typical American families under false identities. It is
vital to understand how these individuals melt into the crowd, hiding
their true identities while they hatch their nefarious plots. Recent events
in Denver and New York City only serve to underscore the urgency of
this need. This article will examine social networking in the context of
social engineering. There are no easy or fast solutions to this problem,
and this paper does not pretend to propose any. Rather, it is the purpose
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/7
of this paper to enhance understanding of this very critical issue, and
perhaps assist organizations and security professionals in developing
policies and training which will mitigate this risk.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/7
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Introduction
The relatively rapid rise in popularity of social networking services is now 
well known. MySpace, Twitter, and Facebook have become well known 
sites and terms. According to the Web traffic tracking site Alexa.com, as of 
December 2009, Facebook had 350 million registered users,2 MySpace 
just under 475 million,3 and Twitter 44.5 million.4 Many people think 
very little of posting prodigious amounts of personal information on 
social networking sites, not realizing that this information puts them at 
risk. Specifically, those in the law enforcement and military communities 
may not realize that information posted on these sites can compromise 
operational security and potentially endanger lives. In July 2009, the 
Associated Press ran a story which was picked up by most major news 
outlets in the USA, in which it was reported that the wife of the incoming 
head of Britain's MI6 intelligence agency had posted pictures and family 
details on her Facebook page.5 Astonishingly, there were those that 
argued that this was not a security breach! Although it is true that, in gen-
eral, photos of a vacationing family would not be considered sensitive, 
when you consider that the family taking the vacation includes the head of 
the British foreign intelligence service, it is easy to see how this kind of 
exposure could open the door to potential blackmail.
We are all too aware of the possibility of terrorist "sleeper cells" living 
among typical American families under false identities. It is vital to 
understand how these individuals melt into the crowd, hiding their true 
identities while they hatch their nefarious plots. Recent events in Denver 
and New York City6 only serve to underscore the urgency of this need. 
This article will examine social networking in the context of social engi-
neering. There are no easy or fast solutions to this problem, and this 
paper does not pretend to propose any. Rather, it is the purpose of this 
paper to enhance understanding of this very critical issue, and perhaps 
assist organizations and security professionals in developing policies and 
training which will mitigate this risk.
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The Weakest Link: The Human Factor
Imagine a security analyst, hired to probe an organization's security and 
determine potential entry points that can be exploited by an attacker. The 
company in question is so security conscious that it has spared no expense 
on both physical and cyber security systems. The company has extremely 
detailed and rigorous security policies and training, which are mandated 
for all employees. There are no passwords under keyboards or taped to 
the side of the computer monitors. Individuals walking the halls without 
proper identification displayed can expect to be stopped and questioned. 
Administrators are conscientious about making sure all security patches 
and antivirus updates are applied to their systems; it goes without saying 
that every system is equipped with antivirus and firewall software. Most 
people would be impressed with the level of security at this company. 
However, if the assessment was done correctly, it will show that this com-
pany is still highly vulnerable to a security breach.
How can a company such as this one be vulnerable? The answer is that 
unless the company has a clear plan and mandated training and retrain-
ing of all employees, a determined attacker can gain access to highly sen-
sitive information by simply asking for it. According to testimony by 
security consultant (and reformed hacker) Kevin Mitnick before the U.S. 
Senate in March of 2000, he was routinely able to gain access to sensitive 
information just by asking for it.7 Many companies cling to the illusion 
that their data is secure because of their investment in a cutting edge tech-
nological security solution, such as "biometrics,"8 "two-factor authentica-
tion,"9 or "smart cards."10 However, treating security as a purely 
technological problem virtually guarantees that these organizations will 
suffer a security breach, as they have overlooked the weakest link in the 
chain of security—the human factor. Indeed, as the technological barriers 
to cracking a network's defenses are strengthened, it becomes more pro-
pitious for attackers to attempt to break into a network via the human ele-
ment. This typically takes no more than a phone call or two, and involves 
minimal risk, while yielding a potentially substantial payoff.
Social Engineering and Abuse of Trust
To break the "weakest link" and defeat security measures by exploiting 
the human factor, an attacker must find a way to trick a trusted user into 
providing access or revealing information. This type of action is referred 
to as social engineering. Social engineering is defined as "the act of 
manipulating people into performing actions or divulging confidential 
information, rather than by breaking in or using technical hacking tech-
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niques."11 Social engineers (the term used to describe those who engage in 
social engineering) typically exhibit strong people skills; they are charm-
ing and likable. Particularly in Western societies, where people live their 
lives with the assumption that the majority of people are not trying to 
deceive them, and the overall probability of being misled is low, people 
tend to lose sight of this threat. A good social engineer will exploit this 
innate trust in other human beings, and make a request that sounds so 
reasonable that it raises no suspicion at all. However, it is possible that 
any information provided, no matter how innocuous it seems, can be that 
final piece of information needed to complete the attack.
There are many examples of attacks which were carried out with what 
appears to have been harmless information. In September 2008, it was 
reported that the personal email account of Sarah Palin had been accessed 
by an unauthorized user.12 At the time, Palin was Governor of Alaska, as 
well as the Republican Vice Presidential nominee. Amazingly, the attacker 
accessed her email with astonishing ease. First, the alleged attacker 
acquired the username (which was easy to do, as that is typically the same 
as the first portion of her email address), and then misrepresented him-
self as her, by claiming to be the legitimate owner of the account and hav-
ing forgetten the account password. The email provider then requested 
some personal information such as zip code, high school, etc. to reset the 
password. This information was easily obtained via Internet search 
engines. The actual attack took under one hour to pull off. Would people 
post the password to their email accounts online? Obviously not. How-
ever, many people see nothing wrong with posting tremendous amounts 
of personal information online, perhaps reasoning that little harm can 
result, since after all, it is only one single piece of information, which in 
and of itself is worthless. In truth though, the attacker uses these bits of 
information to compile a complete profile of the victim, which can then be 
used to mount a succesfull attack. Indeed, the May 2009 attack against 
Twitter.com utilized this method.13
Social Networks: A Potential Security Risk
While social networking services have become widely known and 
immensely popular, few realize the significant security risks that they 
present. Social networking services provide a large amount of personal 
information and raw data about people, organizations, and governments, 
which can be accessed relatively easy and anonymously. This information 
can then be used to target the victim. The United States military has rec-
ognized this as a concern, specifically as it relates to government employ-
ees and military service members. There have been articles in several Air 
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Force Base newspapers discussing the risk that social networking posts 
can pose to operational security. According to the results of a study of 500 
U.S. Air Force members with MySpace profiles, over 300 individuals pro-
vided enough information on MySpace to make them vulnerable to a 
cyber-attack or blackmail—in military parlance "adversary targeting."14 
Fewer than 100 members were found to have low vulnerability (A graphi-
cal representation of the results of the study is provided in Figure 1). Vul-
nerability was established by how much information was provided, 
including name, hometown and state, duty location, job type, and 
whether the profile was public or private. In summary, the report found 
that over 60% of the members surveyed posted too much information.
Figure 1: Percentages of USAF Personnel Posting on MySpace 
Vulnerable to Adversary Targeting
Social networking services have evolved dramatically from their inception 
in the late 1990s. What began as a venue for allowing people to meet and 
link with each other via email, has morphed into complex web-based 
sites, where people can maintain a "buddy list" of friends, chat with them 
in real time (instant messaging), and use a variety of applications built 
into the site to communicate. In so doing, these services have brought an 
inordinate amount of previously private information into the public 
domain. One mechanism by which social engineers can manipulate users 
of social networking sites is by actually becoming online "friends" with the 
target. Once the friendship is confirmed, the social engineer will then pro-
ceed to mine the victim for the information he or she is looking for; care-
fully planting key questions into an otherwise normal conversation. The 
myriad of risks that this issue can pose to military personnel was identi-
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fied by the military over two years ago. To quote U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. 
Joshua Liebold, "As far as people talking about themselves...a foreign spy 
information gatherer could look at [your information] and say, 'OK, that 
might be something to look into. Let's be their friend on MySpace.'...They 
mine you for information."15 In fact, in August 2009, the U.S. Marine 
Corps issued a one-year ban on accessing social networking sites from its 
enterprise network, due to security concerns.16
Social Networking and Cyber Attacks
Another mechanism through which social engineers can leverage social 
networking services in a cyber attack is to gain the trust of the target by 
pretending to be a user who is trusted by the target. A classic example of 
this "abuse of trust" is the Koobface worm or virus. This worm (which has 
an ultimate goal of stealing personal financial information) spreads by 
delivering Facebook messages to people who are friends of a Facebook 
user whose computer has already been infected. The message directs the 
recipients to a third-party website, where they are prompted to download 
what is purported to be a legitimate file. However, if the file is down-
loaded and executed, it will infect their system as well.
A more recent example is the alleged attacks on Google and other corpo-
rate entities, which became public in mid-January 2010. Although the tar-
gets of these attacks were major commercial companies, they could just as 
easily have been military, law enforcement, or government. The malware 
was secreted in an encrypted image file hosted on a website maintained by 
the attackers. The target was directed to the malicious website through a 
carefully crafted "lure" email message. While it has not yet been proven, it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the attackers researched the target's 
personal preferences, hobbies, etc. using information that is publicly 
available through social networking services in order to aid in the crafting 
of the "lure" email, particularly given the pinpoint targeting of the target.
The purpose of this article is not to discuss the technical details of these 
attacks. Nevertheless, there is one aspect of these attacks that stands out 
as an emerging trend in cyber attacks in general. The success rate of the 
attacks is astounding. Virtually all users who received the malicious email 
were duped by the lure, and clicked on the link. Since it is obvious that the 
success rate of the attack is directly proportional to the thoroughness of 
its planning, it is quite clear that this attack was exceedingly well planned. 
A major part of that planning likely involved carefully scoping the tar-
gets—quite possibly using social networking sites.
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Acquiring and Approaching the Target
One of the most critical components of a cyber attack through social net-
working sites is identifying a target. The attacker is typically looking for a 
user who will have access to high level or sensitive information. In order 
to help locate these users, the attacker may do some research using search 
engines such as Google. Most corporate entities make at least part of their 
corporate structure available on the public Internet. Military and law 
enforcement agencies may have notices of appointment and/or promo-
tion carried by the local press. All of this information is cataloged by 
search engines and made generally available to anyone who looks.
Once a target is identified, the attacker cannot send a random email with 
a link to the malicious site or the malware itself. Most computer users 
know never to open attachments or click on links from unsolicited emails. 
Additionally, by sending a random email, the attacker decreases the 
chance of a successful attack. After all, the attacker must be reasonably 
certain that the target will open the document, or click on the link and 
thereby activate the payload. Trying to get someone who is afraid of 
heights to open a document ostensibly containing a quote for mountain-
eering paraphernalia simply will not work.
The attacker may then turn to social networking services, looking for any 
information that would make the target more easily compromised. Infor-
mation of value could include upcoming events, travel plans, associates, 
likes and dislikes, etc.—in short, just about anything that the attacker can 
use to increase credibility. Supposing a scenario where the target does not 
directly post any information that can be of use to an attacker, or if such 
information is posted, it is not made available to those not on the target's 
"friend list," the target may still be vulnerable. A savvy attacker can 
attempt to become online "friends" with individuals on the target's "friend 
list." He or she could then reach out to these associates to discuss what 
appear to be topics of mutual interest, but in reality are attempts to learn 
about the industry. The target may have configured the security settings 
on the social networking service site to prohibit strangers from seeing the 
profile, but to allow "friends of friends" to see it. This provides the 
attacker with the information needed to construct a lure email message 
which is likely to deceive the target.
Security through Obscurity
It should be clear from the above that social networking services can pose 
a very real hazard to the security of corporate entities, government offi-
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cials, and law enforcement personnel. In order to protect their privacy, 
and themselves, users should be encouraged to have as little personal 
information as possible publicly available. Specifically, while it has 
become popular for high-ranking government officials to reach out to 
their constituents via social networking services, the security risks must 
be borne in mind and addressed. Users should not make their profiles 
available to everyone, and should avoid accepting friend requests from 
unknown sources. Strangers online should be treated like strangers 
offline—maintaining requisite politeness and distance. Consider that 
unsolicited friend request as a request for personal information from a 
person who sat next to you on a bus. No rational person would hand over 
confidential information to a complete stranger.
Conclusion
Researchers have identified a paradox in the realm of security called the 
"Paradox of Usable Security," which states that "The more secure the 
technology, the less secure the system."17 In other words, the technologi-
cal complexity of the security of a system is directly related to users' 
attempts to circumvent it. This would seem to imply that having too much 
security could be less than beneficial when not coupled with sound per-
sonnel security and accountability programs. At the same time, a defi-
ciency in security can leave an organization vulnerable to attack. The 
answer to this conundrum of course, is that security is a balancing act. 
The challenge is to find the proper balance of security and productivity.
It is an unfortunate but very real fact is that we do not live in a world 
where we can rely on all people to act in an honest and trustworthy man-
ner all the time. As a society, we must constantly be vigilant, on the look-
out for those who would attempt to deceive us, from within and outside. It 
is important to realize that anyone can make use of social networking sites 
and social engineering tactics to compromise operational and personal 
security. Taking some commonsense steps to protect personal informa-
tion can go a long way in protecting ourselves and our organizations from 
those who seek to do us harm.
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